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Abstract 
 
Recent policy initiatives in the EU aim at supporting so-called Young Innovative 
Companies (YICs).  This paper provides empirical evidence from German CIS 
data on the innovative performances of this specific type of firms, supporting why 
they matter. We first characterize YICs in the sample of innovation active firms.   
We show that firms that combine newness, smallness and high R&D intensity, are 
rare in the sample of innovative firms, but achieve significantly higher innovative 
sales than other innovative firms, especially innovative sales that are new to the 
market. Not surprisingly, YICs view financial constraints, both internal and 
external, as an important factor hampering their innovation activities, significantly 
more so than other innovation active firms.  This access to finance problem is an 
often used motive for government intervention.  In Germany, subsidies schemes 
for innovation are general and not particularly targeted at YICs.  When assessing 
the effectiveness of these public funding schemes for our sample firms, we find 
that they are not effective to increase the innovative sales of YICs, unlike the 
average innovative firm in our sample.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The innovative performance of the US has attracted much attention trying to unravel 
the sources of its success. In the plethora of stories, the entrepreneurial capacity of the 
US is prominent (e.g. Christensen 1997). Small, entrepreneurial firms have been 
responsible for introducing major innovations in the US. With their radical 
innovations these companies reached fast growth and created the scene for new 
products, technologies and markets, on which other firms build further, enhancing 
these breakthroughs and adding to their overall usefulness.  Baumol (2002) notes how 
fortunate the US has been to have this symbiosis of large and small firms.   
 
The EU, in search of explanations for its persistent gap in innovative performance 
relative to US, often refers to its lack of young, fast growing enterprises. As compared 
to the US, the churning that characterizes the creative destruction process in a 
knowledge based economy is hindered in Europe, suggesting barriers to entry, exit, 
innovate and growth for new, small firms (see e.g. Bartelsmann et al., 2000). This 
lack of young innovators hampers Europe’s growth potential not only directly, but 
also indirectly, by affecting the innovation and growth potential of large, incumbent 
firms.  
 
Many EU countries have started to develop, particularly recently, a series of policy 
interventions to support young, innovative companies. The recently revised EU state 
aid rules for innovation support allow for a more favorable treatment by its Members 
States for Young, Innovative Companies (YICs). Several Member States have been 
introducing new measures to support the creation and growth of innovative 
companies, especially by improving their access to funding (BEPA, 2008).     
 
Despite the high policy attention, surprisingly little empirical evidence exists to 
support the failing contribution of small entrepreneurial companies to innovative 
performance in Europe. This paper tries to provide some empirical evidence on the 
innovative performance of young, small innovative companies, using recent firm level 
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evidence from Germany, i.e., the 2005 wave of the German Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS 4).   
 
Also in Germany, newly founded innovative firms have attracted growing interest 
from politicians, looking at them as an answer to ongoing structural changes. 
Numerous studies have identified barriers for German start-ups to innovate and grow, 
related to Germany’s tax system, its insolvency laws and its conservative banking 
system (Licht & Nerlinger 1998). Although the growing policy attention has led to 
new government initiatives, most notably to improve access to finance,  there is 
nevertheless a concern that these new initiatives are too ad hoc, complex, overlapping 
and not focused enough to reach the relevant targets and be effective (Licht & 
Nerlinger 1998).  
 
After identifying the target group of young, small, innovation-intensive companies 
among innovation active companies in Germany, we examine whether they are indeed 
more likely to be successful in introducing new innovations, particularly those radical 
innovations, which are new to the industry or market, and are more likely to have a 
larger social value.  Having checked whether these companies are more hampered 
than average in their innovative activities by barriers such as access to finance, we 
evaluate whether government support (in the form of subsidies) has helped to improve 
their innovative performance.   
 
Our results for Germany support the specific character and importance of YICs.  Even 
if they are small in numbers, YICs have a significantly higher innovative performance 
compared to other innovators, particularly for innovations that are new to the market.  
On the effectiveness of subsidies, our results are less positive.  They suggest that the 
current subsidy allocation mechanisms, which are not targeted specifically to YICs, 
are not associated with better innovative performance of the subsidized YICs.  
 
Before presenting these econometric results in section 4, the paper starts with a 
discussion of the relevant issues and insights clarifying our hypotheses (Section 2), a 
presentation of the data and variables (Section 3) and some first summary statistics of 
the data (section 3). A concluding section summarizes and suggests further avenues 
for research. 
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2.  Background 
 
 
2.1.Defining Young, Innovative Companies (YICs) 
 
Our focus is on companies that have the potential to develop important inventions 
with significant potential commercial applications and high social value. The 
characteristics used to identify Young Innovative Companies (YICs) are a 
combination of age, size and innovation profile. Our definition used in the empirical 
specification draws on EU state-aid rules (cf infra). 
 
A previously widely used concept is that of New Technology Based Firms (NTBFs), 
mostly defined as SMEs in high-tech sectors (e.g. Storey & Thether (1998).1  NTBFs 
do not include the concept of newness of the company and the deepness of its 
technological activities.  Many SMEs in technology intensive sectors could (and in 
fact are) merely adapting innovations already available on the market.   
 
Another related concept, regularly used in the literature is that of “gazelles”.  These 
companies are solely defined on fast growth, and need not necessarily be small, young 
and innovation-active.  In fact, many of the gazelles are not-innovation based.  Veron 
& Philippon (2008) analyze the financing constraints that fast growing firms in 
Europe face.  Hölzl (2008) analyzing fast growing firms across EU countries, finds 
that although, they are more likely to be found in high-tech sectors and be more R&D 
intensive than slow-growing companies,  many “gazelles”, and particularly in 
countries further from the technology frontier, derive their fast growth from a broader 
set of competitive advantages, beyond innovation strictu sensu.   
 
Since we are interested in innovation-active young and small companies, academic 
spin-offs, introducing drastic innovations based on new scientific developments, will 
be an important group of target companies. A large separate body of literature has 
                                                 
1 The Arthur D. Little Group (1977) initially coined the concept, defining it as independently owned 
businesses established for not more than 25 years and based on the exploitation of an invention or 
technological innovation which implies substantial technological risks.  However, in most subsequent 
empirical studies of NTBFs a broader definition is employed: namely those of SMEs in technology 
intensive sectors.  This more common use of a broader definition of NTBFs reflects the available data, 
with company age and the nature of its innovative activities more difficult to collect, especially across 
countries.   
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developed on academic entrepreneurship (see Rothermael, 2008 for a recent survey).  
Our data do not allow identifying the (academic) origin of companies. Hence our 
analysis will include but not distinguish academic entrepreneurs. 
 
  
2.2.Why YICs matter for innovation 
 
 
If YICs justify attention, it will not be because they are large in numbers. In the 
population of firms, they represent only a very small number of companies even if 
expressed relatively to the selection of other small firms, other entrants or other 
innovators. As a consequence their direct contribution to an economy’s employment 
or GDP cannot be substantial, even if they would display a superior growth 
performance. The attention to YICs is rooted in expectations on their direct and 
indirect effects on innovation, and particularly the more radical innovations that shape 
new markets and stir follow-up innovations by other companies.  But are those 
expectations justified? Do YICs indeed contribute over-proportionally to innovative 
performance? 
 
There is a large literature, dating back to Schumpeter 1942, discussing whether large 
or small firms matter more for innovation. While economies of scale and scope in the 
R&D process and complementarities with other competences needed to 
commercialize, favor large firm innovations, arguments in favor for small firms are 
decreasing returns to scale in the production of innovation due to loss of managerial 
control and the bureaucratization of innovation activity. Much of the multivariate 
empirical analysis on the relationship between firm size and innovation, incorporating 
a wide set of firm and industry characteristics as control, has failed to find significant 
results for a positive (or negative) effect of firm size (see e.g. Kamien & Schwartz, 
1982; Cohen & Levin, 1989). Characteristics like market concentration, technological 
opportunities, the stage of the technology life cycle, all matter as intervening variables 
for the effect of firm size. Small firms are for instance more important in less 
concentrated industries (Acs and Audretsch, 1997) and in the early stages of the life 
cycle of an industry, particularly the small entrants (see e.g. Utterback, 1996).   
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Significant literature exists comparing the innovative behavior of new firms versus 
incumbents. The fear of cannibalization of existing profits restricts the incumbent’s 
incentives to innovate (Reinganum, 1983), while the incentive to preempt entry 
pushes incumbent’s innovations (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982). Whether entrants will 
spend more on innovation than incumbents and which indirect effect entry will have 
on incumbents’ innovations depends inter alia on the likelihood of entry, the 
possibility for licensing (Gans and Stern, 2000), the strength of intellectual property 
protection (Anton and Yao, 1994), the stage in the industry life cycle (Klepper, 1996), 
the effectiveness of the market for ideas, the control over complementary assets, the 
association with venture capital, the likelihood of cooperation between entrants and 
incumbents (Gans, Hsu and Stern, 2002). Henderson and Clark (1990) and Henderson 
(1993) show how the nature of the innovation matters, i.e. whether the innovation is 
radical or incremental, incumbent competence enhancing or destroying.  Empirical 
evidence on the photolitographic equipment industry confirms that for incremental 
innovations, incumbent firms spend significantly more on R&D, while for radical 
innovation, entrants are more successful (Henderson 1993).   
 
Overall the literature supports the importance of new, young and therefore often still 
small firms for innovations, even if they would be small in number. If this is the case, 
then factors that would inhibit these small, young companies to innovate can have a 
huge public impact.  
 
2.3. Are YICs constrained in their innovative efforts? 
 
An important barrier to innovation is access to finance. There is a large literature 
demonstrating the substantial differences in this respect between small and large 
firms. Imperfections in capital markets usually affect small firms more than large 
firms, who can rely on more internal financing (Hall, 2005). With reputation and 
collateral being important to mitigate capital market imperfections, young firms are 
even more likely to be constrained than other small firms. More radical investment 
projects further exacerbate the imperfect, incomplete and asymmetric information 
problem. So YICs, combining the disadvantages of small scale, a short history, less 
retained earnings and more risky innovative projects, are even more likely to be 
financially constrained than other small or young or innovating firms.   
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2.4. Should governments support YICs and how? 
 
A typical next step in the argumentation is a need for policies to address the financial 
barriers to innovate for YICs, which are rooted in financial market failure.  This most 
often takes the form of providing financial incentives, such as subsidies or loans.   
However, when designing YIC specific policies it is not sufficient to have established 
the case of YIC specific market failures. With uncertainty, risk, changing 
environments, incomplete, imperfect or asymmetric information, ineffective policy 
responses are also more likely.  
 
A large body of econometrical studies examines the impact of subsidies on private 
R&D spending, testing for the crowding-out hypothesis. In a survey of this literature, 
David, Hall and Toole (2000), conclude that these studies, although plagued by 
methodological issues, on average provide support in favor of no crowding out. More 
recent studies have come up with better data and methodologies (e.g. Wallsten, 2000 
for the US; Czarnitzki and Aerts, 2004 for Flanders; Almus and Czarnitzki, 2007 for 
Germany; Takalo et al., 2008 for Finland; Lach, 2002 for Israel; Gonzàlez et al., 2005 
for Spain).  Most of these studies confirm the positive results.     
 
Focusing on the crowding-out effects, this line of research typically does not identify 
the effects of subsidies on the (innovative) performance of recipients. They also 
ignore the issue of whether a more targeted policy towards specific firms, like the 
YICs, would be more or less favorable to positive effects. In a very recent study, 
Colombo et al (2008), provide evidence on Italian data for different effects of funding 
depending on the stage of development of the recipient firm. They found that new 
technology based firms benefit more (in terms of firm growth) than mature ones from 
financial support, especially if public funds are allocated through a selective 
evaluation process.    
 
2.5. Our contribution 
 
Our analysis contributes to the literature by analyzing the relationship between YICs 
and innovative performance. To this end, we use micro-data from Germany, i.e. the 
2005 wave of the German Community Innovation Survey (CIS 4). This rich data set 
allows us to:  
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(i) identify YICs for Germany on the characteristics of size, age and 
innovation profile  
(ii) characterize whether YICs are more constrained by barriers for innovation 
and econometrically investigate whether YICs are more constrained by 
access to finance than other innovators 
(iii) econometrically investigate whether YICs are indeed more likely to be 
innovation performing, and particularly more likely to introduce radical 
innovations; 
(iv) econometrically investigate the impact of government support on the 
innovative performance of YICs. 
 
Overall, the results confirm our presumption that YICs achieve higher innovative 
performances than do other firms. This result is particularly strong for “radical” type 
of innovations. We also find that access to finance is the most important factor that 
hampers YICs’ innovation activities. We therefore evaluate the effectiveness of R&D 
public funding and find that while on average R&D subsidies increase the innovative 
performances of firms, this result does not hold for YICs.   
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1 Sample  
 
The data used stem from the German part of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 
conducted by EUROSTAT in European Union Member States in 2005 (CIS-IV)2. We 
restrict attention to West German firms only, avoiding a source of heterogeneity that 
is outside our issues of interest.  The survey contains questions related to the 
innovation strategies of firms. In addition, the questionnaire contains information on 
respondent’s motives for innovation, perceptions of innovation barriers and 
effectiveness of appropriation strategies. Lastly, the survey contains quantitative 
information on the firm, such as sales, age or employment. For the remainder of our 
                                                 
2 The survey is direct to a stratified sample of companies in manufacturing and services sectors with at 
least 5 employees.  Although the very small firms are not targeted,  the sample nevertheless contains 
5% of firms with less than 5 employees,  while 23% of the sample of YICs are firms with less than 5 
employees.   
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analysis, we focus on innovation active firms, as most of our variables of interest are 
only available for these firms (1,715 observations). Although the dataset is rich in 
variables, its main restriction is the cross-section nature of the dataset, limiting the 
construction of control variables for innovative performance and excluding a thorough 
analysis of the subsequent sales and employment growth performance patterns of 
these companies. 
 
3.2. Hypotheses and Variables 
 
The aim of this paper is basically twofold: (i) to study the differential innovative 
performances of YICs and (ii) to evaluate the differential efficiency of R&D subsidies 
in affecting the innovative performance of recipients. This section discusses the 
variables used in the analysis. A list of variables and their definitions can also be 
found in Appendix 1. 
 
 
3.2.1.  Defining YICs  
 
Our variable characterizing YICs follows the recently revised European 
Commission’s State Aid rules3, 4 which allow a more favorable treatment of national 
governments to provide R&D subsidies and tax incentives to YICs. The YIC dummy 
takes a value of 1 if an innovation active company is less than 6 years old, has less 
than 250 employees and spends at least 15% of its revenues on R&D.  
 
Having identified YICs along EU State Aid Rules, a summary statistics analysis 
reported in section 4.1 provides a first characterization of YICs.  We also have a look 
at how YICs score differently on perceived barriers to innovation. Section 4.2. 
provides the econometric analysis on innovative performance and subsidy 
effectiveness. Throughout the econometric analysis, we check the robustness of our 
results using alternative thresholds for age, size and/or R&D intensity to characterize 
a YIC.  
                                                 
3  Young Innovative Enterprises are defined in the EU State Aid Rules as small Enterprises, less than 6 
years old, having being “certified’ by external experts on the basis of a business plan, as capable of 
developing products or processes which are technologically new or substantially improved and which 
carry a risk of technological or commercial failure, or have R&D intensity of at least 15% in the last 
three years or currently (for start-ups).    
4 Note that Germany did not adopt the YICs status yet in its subsidy programs, therefore our results will 
not be driven by this new policy measure. 
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3.2.2. YICs  and innovative performance 
 
The main hypothesis we want to examine is whether YICs have a higher innovative 
performance as compared to other innovation-active firms, particularly with respect to 
more radical innovations.   
 
To analyze innovative performance, we use three alternative dependent variables. 
First, we use the percentage of sales generated by new or substantially improved 
products or services (SSnewimp). Second, we measure innovative performance using 
the share of sales with products new to the firm (SSnewF). Finally, we use the share of 
sales generated by products new to the market (SSnewM). These three measures of 
innovative performance capture different degrees of “radicalness” of a firm’s 
innovative output. The first measure encompasses sales from all type of innovations, 
new as well as substantially improved innovations. The second measure excludes 
cumulative innovations made within a focal firm, hence excluding improved follow-
up innovations, but could include innovations which were not new to the market, but 
new to the firm. The third measure only takes into account those innovations that are 
new to the market. The latter measure is our closest measure for more “drastic” 
innovations. The degree of “newness to the market” is however based on a subjective 
evaluation of the respondents and might still include innovations which, although new 
to the market, but perhaps are not the radical new original breakthrough innovations 
we are most interested in. The survey contains no information to further codify the 
radicalness of innovations new to the market. 
   
When regressing our measures of innovative performance on the YICs dummy, we 
also include a set of control variables. Following the literature, we include the size of 
the focal firm, measured by the logarithm of employment. By using a logarithmic 
specification we already are allowing for a more favourable treatment of smaller sized 
firms. We also include the logarithm of firm age. We also control for the input of 
R&D resources into the firm’s innovative process, measured by the ratio of 
(intramural) R&D expenditures to sales (R&D intensity). In addition, we include the 
nature of the innovative strategy, i.e. how basic the R&D process is. More basic R&D 
increases the risk of the innovation process, but entails a higher probability of 
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generating drastic innovations. We measure basicness as the importance (on a scale 
from 1 to 5) of information from public research institutes and universities relative to 
the importance of customers and suppliers as an information source (Cassiman and 
Veugelers, 2006). We also include a dummy for firms that are part of a group 
(Group). It takes the value one if an establishment is part of a larger entity. Firms that 
are part of a larger group may draw on the group’s financial and technological 
resources that could make them more likely to innovate than firms with the same 
characteristics but that are independent.  Finally, we control for industry specific 
characteristics by including 14 sector dummies that were constructed based on their 
NACE codes, a nomenclature of economic activities in the European Community.    
 
The model is estimated by OLS and Tobit.  The Tobit specification allows to account 
for the large degree of left censoring (or corner solution outcome), which is 
particularly important for the SSnewM and SSnewF specification.   
The specifications we estimate can be summarized as: 
(i) OLS:   iiii uXYICs +++=Π 21 ββα  
(ii) Tobit: );0max( 21 iiii XYICs εδδγ +++=Π  
Where Πi corresponds to our alternative measures of innovation performance and Xi is 
a vector of controls containing age, size, R&D intensity, basicness and the sector 
dummies.  The results are reported in section 4.2. 
   
3.2.3. Subsidies, YICs, innovative performance  
 
Providing an overview of the initiatives that exist in Germany to subsidize innovative 
companies is not easy, as the responsibility for subsidy programs is distributed among 
several federal ministries, regional ministries (Länder) and autonomous organizations 
(see Licht and Nerlinger, 1998).5 Total public expenditures on R&D in Germany 
originating from the federal level and the regional governments (Länder) are almost 
equally important. EU subsidies are less important (Licht and Nerlinger, 1998).  
Although SMEs are favored targets, most of the programs at the time of the survey do 
not seem to be specifically targeted at YICs. Direct public support from the federal 
                                                 
5 In fact, the huge number and complexity of programs offered by the several agencies and ministries, 
is often quoted as a factor limiting the effectiveness of these programs.  A lot of particularly small and 
young firms are not applying for programs that are available for them, for lack of resources and 
information.  This is why a simplification of the support schemes has taken place in more recent years.   
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level is more focused on specific areas of technology and specific regions 6 rather than 
on specific types of firms (Licht and Nerlinger, 1998).7 Also at EU level there were, at 
the time of the sample, no specific subsidy schemes or favorable treatments in 
existing schemes for YICs. 
 
In order to assess the effectiveness of public funding, we use in the innovative 
performance regression a dummy variable indicating whether a focal firm was 
subsidized by the German federal government, by the regional government in which 
they are located, or by the European Union (Subsidized).8 We include the subsidy 
dummy in the innovative performance analysis as well as an interaction between the 
YICs and subsidy dummy. This allows us to evaluate the effectiveness of receiving 
subsidies for all firms, but also differentially for YICs.  
 
It is important to mention that we are restricted to a cross-sectional approach, 
regressing contemporaneous subsidies on innovative performance. However, the 
receipt of public subsidies is highly persistent over time. For example, Aerts (2008) 
for Flanders and Hussinger (2008) for Germany show that past subsidies are strongly 
related to receiving current public funding. Therefore, we argue that current subsidies 
are a good approximation of a firm’s R&D funding history. 9 
 
Regressing any measure of research output on the receipt of a R&D subsidy is not 
unproblematic. The selection problem that arises in attempting to assess the impact of 
a public program is well known in the economic literature (Heckman et al., 1998; 
Klette et al., 2000; David et al., 2000 or Jaffe, 2002). Variables that are unobservable 
                                                 
6 At the time of the survey, a substantial part of federal government R&D expenditures was dedicated 
to the ongoing transformational process in the east of Germany after the reunification in 1989. This is 
one of the reasons we focus the analysis on West German companies only. 
7 The Federal Government in Germany has more recently implemented a tripartite structure to improve 
financing for technology-based start-ups, especially concerning access to venture capital (VC). The 
ERP Innovation program, a loan program for R&D and innovation financing in SMEs, is redesigned in 
order to better address current market failures in loan financing of innovation.  None of these programs 
are specifically dedicated to YICs. 
8 We have no information on the amount of subsidies received, nor any other public support.   
Typically, sample firms that receive subsidies from one funding agency are also likely to receive R&D 
grants from other agencies.   This precludes analyzing the effectiveness of subsidies by funding agency 
in our sample. 
9 This is similar to the results from patent-R&D relationships, where contemporaneous R&D typically 
has the most important effect on the number of patents taken out by a given firm, when compared to 
lagged values of R&D incurred by the same firm  (Hall et al (1986)).    
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by the econometrician might be correlated with the receipt of a public subsidy. These 
variables could be the budgets submitted to the agency, the agency’s personal 
knowledge of the applicants or the quality of the research projects proposed (Jaffe, 
2002). Therefore, the subsidy dummy is unlikely to be exogenous, which is why we 
use an instrumental variable (IV) approach.  
 
The typical instruments used to tackle this issue are the yearly or industry-specific 
available budgets (Lichtenberg, 1988; Wallsten, 2000). Since we do not have 
information about the funding agencies’ budgets, we use two alternative (but closely 
related) instruments. We hypothesize that the probability of receiving a R&D subsidy 
depends on the preferences of public policy agents, as expressed through their specific 
public policies in place. We characterize these public policies along their regional and 
technological dimensions. The first instrument we use is the share of subsidized firms 
in the region where the focal firm is established. We hypothesize that a region with a 
high share of subsidized firms reflects a targeted policy objective from the 
government or the regional authorities, for example an affirmative action type of 
policy that leads the authorities to subsidize firms in less developed regions. 
Similarly, we also use the share of subsidized firms per industry (at the NACE 2-digit 
level), the presumption being that specific industrial policies will lead the funding 
authorities to favour one or the other sector of the economy. Both assumptions, 
namely a regional and technology specific preference in R&D subsidy schemes, seem 
to hold in the case of Germany (Licht and Nerlinger, 1998).  
 
If the subsidy dummy is correlated with the unobservables, then the interaction term 
between the subsidy and YICs dummies is also expected to be endogenous. Therefore, 
we follow Wooldridge (2001) and use the interactions between the instruments 
presented above and the YICs dummy as a source of exogenous variation in the first 
stage equation. 
 
In the linear case, we use standard two-stage least squares (2SLS) methods. In the 
Tobit case we use Newey’s two-step approach. We estimate the first stage equations 
with linear probability models, since this will yield consistent estimates in the 
equation of interest (if the instruments are valid), whether or not the first stage 
equation is linear (Angrist, 2001; Wooldridge, 2002).   
 14
 
The results on the impact of subsidies on innovative performance are reported in 
section 4.3. In order to motivate our focus on subsidies, we also provide some 
econometric evidence, reported in the Appendix, on whether YICs are indeed more 
likely to be financially constrained. As measure for financial constraint, we use the 
respondent’s perception of lack of financing (both internal as well as external) as 
barrier to innovation. Since these variables are not measuring the actual financial 
constraints, but only the awareness of the respondent, we do not use this information 
further in the subsidy-innovative performance analysis. As also other studies have 
shown using similar data (Mohnen et al. 2008; Tivari et al., 2007; Savignac, 2008), it 
is often the companies most active in innovation and who have been active on the 
financial markets that are more “aware” of the constraints, but are not necessarily 
more constrained.10  The sample does not provide objective financial information on 
actual constraints.  
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Some descriptive analysis 
 
4.1.1. Characterizing YICs 
 
Out of our sample of 1342 innovation-active companies, only 51 companies qualify 
for YIC status, using our EU State Aid definition. This confirms the “rareness” of 
YICs, representing only 3.8% of all innovation-active companies in West-Germany in 
2005. Even within the group of small innovators or young innovators, YICs are rare 
(resp 4.3% and 24%).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Also in our sample, when we include financial constraints in the performance regression, the 
perceived financial constraints have a positive correlation with innovation performance.  We lack 
relevant instruments to correct this bias.   
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Table 1: summary statistics 
 
YICs 
(N=51) 
Variables N Mean S.D. 
Size (sales) 51 19.686 33.969 
Age 51 4.196 1.341 
R&D intensity 51 0.638 1.173 
Basicness 49 0.807 0.488 
Group 50 40.00% 0.495 
 
 
Other innovators 
(N=1342) 
Other young Innovators  
(<6 yrs old) (N=213) 
Other small innovators 
(< 250 empl)(N=1187) 
Other R&D intensive innovators  
(R&D intensity >15%)(N=501) 
Variables N mean S.D. N mean S.D. N mean S.D. N Mean S.D. 
Size 1342 1274.723 9878.847 213 241.770 672.477 1187 61.568 64.445 500 1936.292 20561.220 
Age 1342 36.688 37.812 213 4.075 1.597 1182 30.888 33.258 497 30.867 33.778 
R&D intensity 1342 0.0880 0.858 181 0.216 0.674 970 0.136 1.049 187 0.568 2.346 
Basicness 1285 0.548 0.423 197 0.572 0.388 1081 0.517 0.432 422 0.612 0.517 
Group 1328 67.02% 0.470 209 0.598 0.491 1173 0.541 0.499 491 0.578 0.494 
 
A “typical” YIC has a micro size, with about 20 employees.  This is considerably 
smaller than other innovating SMEs, as well as young innovators and especially other 
R&D intensive innovators.   Half of the YICs have less than 9 employees, 23% less 
than 5.  Also on R&D intensity and basicness of its R&D profile, a “typical” YIC 
scores much higher than any of these reference categories. These statistics confirm 
that it is a combination of age, size and R&D profile that composes the particularity of 
YICs. YICs are not the same as innovative SMEs, young innovators or R&D intensive 
innovators.      
 
Although YICs are much less likely to be part of a group as compared to other firms, 
4 out of 10 YICs are nevertheless part of a group. It is however not possible to 
identify in the dataset the nature and importance of this group relationship, how it 
affects the independence of the company. Some subsidiaries may be funded by their 
parents firm, while others may be left to survive on their own. 
 
Table 2 disaggregates all firms in our sample by sectoral classification and shows that 
YICs are concentrated in a few sectors only. More specifically, YICs are 
overrepresented in knowledge-intensive, technological sectors, specifically services 
(ICT and R&D engineering) while they are absent in more traditional manufacturing 
industries.   
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Table 2: Industry classification 
   YICs Other Innovators 
Sector   Frequency % Frequency % 
1 food and Tobacco 0 0.00% 41 3.06% 
2 Textiles and leather 1 1.96% 38 2.83% 
3 Wood, paper and publishing 4 7.84% 101 7.53% 
4 Chemicals and petroleum 6 11.76% 152 11.33% 
5 glass, ceramics and furnitures 0 0.00% 38 2.83% 
6 Metal 0 0.00% 144 10.74% 
7 Machinery and equipment 0 0.00% 136 10.14% 
8 electrical machinery, medical and optical instruments 6 11.76% 197 14.69% 
9 Motor vehicles 1 1.96% 52 3.88% 
10 sales of motor vehicles, wholesale and retail trade 0 0.00% 66 4.92% 
11 Transportation and communication 1 1.96% 76 5.67% 
12 ICT 12 23.53% 85 6.34% 
13 Research, experimental development and engineering 17 33.33% 85 6.34% 
14 Consulting 3 5.88% 130 9.69% 
 
 
4.1.2. YICs and barriers to innovation 
 
Table 3 presents the results on whether YICs perceive differently obstacles to 
innovation. Respondents were asked to give a score to each (potential) hampering 
factor on a scale going from zero (not relevant) to three (high). The first column 
indicates the share of firms that considered this factor to be relevant (i.e. firms that 
scored one or more), while the second column reports the average score. 
 
Table 3: Obstacles to innovation 
 YICs Other Innovators  
Barriers to innovation % 
mean 
score % 
Mean 
score 
mean  
diff. with 
YICs 
External financial constraints 95.65% 2.283 75.75% 1.234 -1.049*** 
Internal financial constraints 93.30% 2.457 66.42% 1.382 -1.074*** 
Innovation costs too high 93.33% 2.356 87.71% 1.862 -0.493*** 
Uncertain demand for innovative products 89.13% 1.435 74.60% 1.241 -0.193 
Regulations 71.74% 1.196 64.70% 1.122 -0.073 
Lack of qualified personnel 71.74% 1.087 72.56% 1.163 0.076 
Lack of information on technology 69.57% 0.935 63.20% 0.82 -0.115 
Lack of information on markets 69.57% 1.087 67.56% 0.961 -0.125 
Difficulty of finding cooperation partners 67.39% 1.109 53.90% 0.785 -0.323** 
Market dominated by established firms 65.22% 1.152 62.14% 1.018 -0.134 
No demand for innovation 54.55% 0.818 51.74% 0.803 -0.015 
Resistance to change 52.17% 0.630 60.08% 0.811 0.180 
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As expected, YICs face, on average, higher obstacles to innovation than other 
innovating firms. When comparing across barriers, the results confirm the 
presumption that financial constraints are the most important barriers to innovation 
for YICs, both internal and external financial constraints.  Although this ranking holds 
for other innovating firms too, the YIC-differential effect is largest on both financial 
constraints and strongly statistically significant.    
 
As concerns other barriers to innovation, YICs are more impeded by uncertainty of 
demand for their innovations. This is consistent with and confirms a higher 
risk/radicalness profile of YICs.  Despite this high risk profile, YICs seem to be less 
impeded by “resistance to change”. However, none of these differences are 
statistically significant. Regulations score higher as barriers for YICs than for other 
innovators, but again the difference is not significant. Also, lack of information and 
lack of qualified personnel are important barriers for YICs, but to a very similar 
extent as other innovators. The “market dominated by established firms” barrier 
scores somewhat stronger for YICs as compared to other innovators, but the 
difference is again not significant. Only on difficulty of finding cooperative partners, 
there is a significantly higher effect for YICs.   
 
For none of the barriers, except for internal and external financial constraints, a YICs 
differential effect survives an econometric analysis, correcting for other firm and 
industry characteristics. Appendix 2 provides the results from an ordered probit model 
to explain the importance of access to finance (internal and external) as barrier to 
innovation. The results confirm that small innovators are more likely to be financially 
constrained (both internally and externally), and so are innovators that have a more 
basic innovative profile. But on top of these effects, YICs are significantly more 
likely to be financially constrained (both internal and external). These results 
therefore support the case for public policy attention targeting access to finance for 
YICs. 
 
4.1.3. YICs and subsidies 
 
Table 4 provides some descriptive statistics on YICs and subsidies. YICs are heavily 
subsidized, since more than 40% of them received subsidies. This compares to only 
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14% for all innovators, 11% for small innovators, 17% for young innovators and only 
20% for R&D intensive innovators.   
 
Table 4:  YICs and subsidies 
 YICs 
Variable N mean S.D. 
Received subsidies 31 0.419 0.502 
 
 
 
Other 
innovators 
Other young 
innovators 
Other small 
innovators 
Other R&D intensive 
innovators 
 
Variable 
mea
n S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D. 
Received 
subsidies 
0.13
9 
0.34
6 0.171 0.378 0.113 0.316 0.218 0.414 
 
 
The most frequently observed funding agency is the German Federal Government 
(44%), followed by regional authorities (28%) and the European Union (24%). The 
distribution of subsidies received by YICs across funding agencies is exactly the same 
as in the overall sample of innovative firms. Typically, firms that receive subsidies 
from a given funding agency also receive R&D grants from at least one of the other 
agencies: 87% of firms that received a subsidy from the Federal Government also got 
a subsidy from another authority, 85% for the regional authorities, 86% for the EU 
and 77% for other agencies. This high level of co-occurrence of subsidies from 
different granting agencies, makes it difficult to disentangle the funding agency in the 
analysis on the effectiveness of subsidies. 
 
4.1.4. YICs and innovative performance 
 
Table 5 provides some summary statistics on the innovative performance of YICs.  
These first results suggest that YICs on average have substantially higher sales from 
new or substantially improved products, as compared to other innovators (SSnewimp).  
The differential amounts to 2.4. This differential is smaller when comparing with 
other young innovators and other R&D intensive innovators, which are typically older 
and larger, but it is nevertheless still substantial and statistically significant. For our 
measure of more radical innovations, share of sales with market novelties (SSnewM), 
the performance differential for YICs over other innovators is even more impressive, 
with YICs scoring 5 times higher on average than other innovators on average, 2.5 
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larger than other R&D intensive innovators or other young innovators. Also for share 
of sales with products new to the firm (SSnewF), the YIC differential is higher (again 
5 times larger). Although standard deviations are substantial, the mean difference 
remains statistically significant. These first summary statistics are supportive of the 
notion that YICs superior innovative performance comes out most strongly for 
innovations that are not improvements to existing innovations.   
 
Table 5:  YICs and Innovative Performance 
 YICs 
Variables N mean S.D. 
Share of sales with new/improved products (SSnewimp) 45 0.600 0.313 
Share of sales with market novelties (SSnewF) 45 0.360 0.375 
Share of sales with products new to the firm (SSnewM) 44 0.292 0.348 
 
 Other innovators Other young innovators Other small innovators Other R&D intensive firms 
Variables 
mea
n S.D. 
sign dif.  
with 
YICs 
mea
n S.D. 
sign dif.  
with 
YICs 
mea
n S.D. 
sign dif.  
with 
YICs Mean S.D. 
sign dif.  
with 
YICs 
Share of sales with new/improved 
products 
0.26
1 
0.24
4 *** 
0.37
7 
0.32
6 *** 
0.29
1 
0.27
2 *** 
35.82
% 
0.30
4 *** 
Share of sales with market novelties 
0.07
2 
0.14
4 *** 
0.14
5 
0.26
4 *** 
0.09
1 
0.19
0 *** 
12.95
% 
0.24
3 *** 
Share of sales with products new to the 
firm 
0.05
8 
0.11
2 *** 
0.14
0 
0.25
9 *** 
0.07
5 
0.15
5 *** 9.38% 
0.19
2 *** 
 
 
On growth of sales or employment, measured over the period 2002-2004, YICs score 
significantly higher: their average sales growth is 61%, compared to “only” 24% for 
other innovators. Similarly for employment growth, YICs report an average 24% 
versus 6% for other innovators. This confirms that YICs extend their superior 
innovative performance into a higher performance on sales and employment growth 
as well, easily qualifying as “gazelles”.   
 
4.2. Econometric results 
 
4.2.1. Baseline results: the innovative performances of YICs 
 
In order to evaluate the innovative performances of YICs relative to other types of 
firms, we first regress the YICs dummy and the control variables on our measures of 
innovative performance. These first set of results are presented in Table 6.  
 
The results reveal that YICs achieve, on average, a higher innovation performance 
than other innovators.  This result holds for all type of innovation measures but the 
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effect is stronger for the measure of sales with market novelties (SSnewM) and weaker 
for sales with products new to the firm (SSnewF), suggesting that YICs are most 
differentially successful when it comes to introducing innovations new to the market, 
which confirms our hypothesis.   
 
Table 6: Estimation results for YICs and innovative performance (1)  
 
Share of sales with new/improved products 
SSnewimp 
Share of sales with products new to the firm 
SSnewF 
Share of sales with market novelties 
SSnewM 
 OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit 
  Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. 
log(age) -0.015 * 0.008 -0.015 * 0.008 -0.008 * 0.004 -0.012 * 0.007 -0.009 * 0.005 -0.021 ** 0.009 
Log(employment) -0.010 ** 0.005 -0.010 ** 0.005 -0.005 * 0.002 0.001  0.004 -0.004  0.003 0.007  0.005 
R&D intensity 0.122 *** 0.026 0.123 *** 0.027 0.096 *** 0.014 0.100 *** 0.021 0.113 *** 0.017 0.131 *** 0.027 
Basic R&D reliance -0.008  0.018 -0.010  0.018 -0.007  0.009 -0.006  0.015 -0.014  0.011 -0.025  0.020 
Group 0.010  0.017 0.010  0.017 -0.011  0.009 -0.014  0.015 0.006  0.011 0.022  0.019 
YICs 0.207 *** 0.043 0.210 *** 0.043 0.138 *** 0.022 0.179 *** 0.035 0.206 *** 0.027 0.276 *** 0.045 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.302 *** 0.053 0.297 *** 0.053 0.083 *** 0.027 0.004   0.045 0.078 ** 0.033 -0.080   0.061 
Sigma      0.239  0.005      0.186  0.006      0.237  0.008 
Log-likelihhod      -14.750821      -169.39704      -307.56382 
Number of observations 1066 1066 (28 left cens.) 1070 
1070 (490 left 
cens.) 1076 1076 (523 left cens.) 
 
Regarding the control variables, the data confirm that R&D intensive, young and 
small firms are more successful in introducing innovative products.11 The basicness of 
a firm’s R&D and belonging to larger group seem to have no significant effect on 
innovative performance.12 Important to note is that, even when correcting for firm 
size, age, R&D intensity and the basicness profile of the firm’s innovation strategy, 
the significant positive effect for YICs prevails. This implies that YICs display a 
superior innovative performance on top of the fact that they are small, young and 
R&D intensive. It reflects the additional effect of combining all these 
characteristics.13,14  
                                                 
11 Similar results are obtained (i.e. a significantly positive coefficient for YICs) when including 
categorical dummies for firm size, age and R&D intensities, rather than (log) linear version of these 
variables. 
12 Ignoring these variables in the analysis does not affect the results on the other coefficients.   
13 Note that our YIC dummy is not the same as including an interaction term of size, age and R&D 
intensity.  Such an interaction term would imply a combined effect of the three variables similar across 
the whole distribution.  Our YIC dummy captures only a combination from size, age and R&D 
intensity, in the interval of young, small and highly R&D intensive firms, which is where the strongest 
arguments are for expecting a combined effect. 
14 In order to check whether the YIC dummy is merely picking up some extra non-linearity in the size, 
age or R&D intensity dimension which we have not sufficiently controlled for, we also included in the 
regression on top of the existing variables, 3 extra dummies, one for young firms (<=6),  one for small 
firms (<=250) and one for high R&D intensity (>15%).   The YICs coefficient remains highly 
significant and at very similar level for the SSnewF and SSnewM specifications.  In the SSnewimp 
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4.2.2. Sensitivity of performance effects with respect to YIC definition 
 
Table 7 summarizes the results from a robustness analysis on the identification of the 
YICs target group.  Relaxing unilaterally the size criterion does not yield many extra 
observations, as long as the age constraint is maintained. Dropping size altogether, i.e. 
targeting young innovation-intensive firms, results in 4 extra YIC cases. None of the 
reported results change with these limited number of extra cases, and are therefore not 
reported. The most sensitive changes involve the age and RDI criterion. Expanding 
the age criterion to 15 years (scenario 2), would yield 48 extra YIC cases.15  Dropping 
the age constraint altogether (scenario 3), i.e. targeting small, innovative-intensive 
companies, irrespective of their age, would leave 139 positive cases. While the 
superior performance effects are only marginally affected for new or improved 
innovations (SSnewimp), the effects excluding improvements are more seriously 
affected, especially on innovations new to the firm (SSnewF). Reducing the R&D 
intensity criterion to 8%, which is the sample average, would yield 21 extra YIC cases 
(scenario 4).  The results on SSnewimp and SSnewF are only marginally affected, but 
the superior YIC effect for innovative sales new to the market (SSnewM) drops 
substantially, albeit remaining significant. Dropping the RDI criterion altogether, i.e. 
targeting, young and small innovators, would result in 139 positive cases (scenario 5).  
In this case, the YIC effect is substantially reduced, most notably on the innovative 
sales new to the market dimension (SSnewM). Relaxing simultaneously the age, size 
and RDI criteria to more generous levels (scenario 6: resp <15, <500 and >8%) would 
give 166 YICs, 12% of innovative companies in the sample. The superior YICs effect 
is again only marginally affected for new or improved innovations (SSnewimp), but 
more seriously affected for innovations new to the market (SSnewM) and new to the 
                                                                                                                                            
specification, the YIC coefficient remains significant but looses half of its value.   The age and size 
dummies are never significant, indicating that beyond the logarithmic specification for age and size, 
there are no extra non-linearities in size and age to account for.  For R&D intensity, the dummy turns 
out significantly positive in the SSnewimp and the SSnewM, but not in the SSnewF.  Also other non-
linear specifications for RDI hint at a convex relationship, with companies at the very high end of the 
R&D intensity distribution, being more innovative performing.  Nevertheless, despite this non-linearity 
in RDI, YICs who combine high RDI with a young age, significantly and substantially outperform 
these counterparts.  
15 An age criterion of 15 is currently being advocated by the Biotech sector.  Interestingly in our 
sample, the extra observations from relaxing the age constraint are not found in bio-tech, but mostly in 
ICT and instruments. 
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firm (SSnewF). Nevertheless, in all cases a significant superior innovative 
performance effect remains 16.     
Table 7: Results for the YICs coefficient in innovative performance using alternative YIC 
scenarios  
Tobit Results 
 
 Age 
Criterion 
Size 
Criterion 
RDI 
Criterion 
YIC 
observations
YICs in 
SSnewimp
YICs in 
SSnewF 
YICs in 
SSnewM 
1 <6 <250 >15% 51 0.210*** 
(0.043) 
0.179*** 
(0.035) 
0.276*** 
(0.045) 
2 <15 <250 >15% 99 0.221*** 
(0.033) 
0.099*** 
(0.027) 
0.246*** 
(0.034) 
3 All <250 >15% 139 0.183*** 
(0.026) 
0.033 
(0.022) 
0.156*** 
(0.028) 
4 <6 <250 >8% 72 0.183*** 
(0.038) 
0.171*** 
(0.031) 
0.177*** 
(0.041) 
5 <6 <250 All 139 0.059** 
(0.029) 
0.093*** 
(0.025) 
0.076** 
(0.033) 
6 <15 <500 >8% 166 0.159*** 
(0.027) 
0.040** 
(0.024) 
0.165*** 
(0.03) 
 
Overall, these sensitivity results suggest that the superior YIC innovative performance 
effect is robust, at least for not too drastic and unidimensional changes to the criteria.  
Particularly, the results on innovative performance that includes improvements 
(SSnewimp) are robust for extensions of the YIC criterion.   However for innovations 
new to the market and new to the firm, the superior performance of the target groups, 
although still significant, becomes less impressive, particularly when affecting the age 
and R&D intensity criterion substantially or in combination.  This suggests the use of 
a not too broad definition for YICs to maintain a profile of more radical innovators.   
 
Finally, we also checked the sensitivity of our results when using a definition 
reflecting New Technology Based Firms (NTBFs). 498 companies (or almost one 
third of all sample innovative firms) classify as SMEs in high-tech sectors, with high-
tech sectors identified as sectors 4 (chemicals), 8 (electrical machinery & 
instruments), 12 (ICT services) and 13 (R&D services). Interestingly, the NTBF 
dummy never shows up significantly in any innovative performance regression, once 
correcting for size and sectors.    
                                                 
16 Our YIC results also remain robust when applying the R&D intensity criterion to employment rather 
than sales.  There is no obvious translation of the 15% RDI-sales criterion, used in the EU State Aid 
rules into employment.  When we use a cut off value of 0.03 for the R&D to employment ratio (which 
is 3 times higher than the average for all sample firms), we obtain almost the same number of YICs and 
also almost identical results to table 4. 
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4.2.3. YICs and subsidies 
In this section we examine the effectiveness of public support for innovative 
performance, and particularly public support for YICs, in the form of subsidies.  The 
results reported in section 4.1, documenting the significantly larger internal and 
external financial constraints perceived by YICs,  support the case for public policy 
attention targeting access to finance for YICs, particularly as this barrier is rooted in 
market failure. This however does not imply that subsidy policies will be successful, 
as government failure may arise.   
 
In order to assess the effectiveness of government subsidies on innovative 
performance of recipients, we introduce in the innovative performance regression, the 
subsidy dummy, reflecting whether the innovator has received subsidies or not. We 
also include an interaction variable taking a value of 1 if it concerns a subsidized YIC.   
As there are many missing observations for the subsidy variable, this part of the 
analysis is performed with a significantly lower sample size. The results using OLS 
and Tobit are reported in Table 6, while the IV results are reported in Table 7.  
 
Overall, the signs and magnitudes of the coefficient for the controls do not change 
significantly when the additional subsidy variables are introduced in the OLS and 
Tobit analysis (Table 8). The overall effect of YICs remains strongly positive and 
significant in all three specifications.  
 
Subsidies have a positive effect on innovation performance, an effect which is 
significant for the SSnewimp and SSnewM specification. Interestingly, there is no 
significant additional effect for subsidized YICs. Subsidized YICs perform as well as 
other YICs and the effect of subsidies on innovative performance is as high for YICs 
as it is for other subsidized companies. 
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Table 8: Estimation results for YICs, subsidies and innovative performance  
(1) OLS & Tobit 
 
Share of sales with new/improved products 
SSnewimp 
Share of sales with products new to the firm 
SSnewF 
Share of sales with market novelties 
SSnewM 
 OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit 
Variables Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. 
Log(age) -0.015  0.010 -0.015  0.010 -0.007  0.005 -0.011  0.009 -0.008  0.006 -0.019  0.012 
Log(employment) -0.013 ** 0.006 -0.013 ** 0.006 -0.003  0.003 0.004  0.005 -0.006  0.004 0.006  0.007 
R&D intensity 0.103 *** 0.031 0.104 *** 0.031 0.079 *** 0.016 0.084 *** 0.025 0.093 *** 0.020 0.112 *** 0.034 
Basicness -0.005  0.025 -0.004  0.025 -0.002  0.012 -0.012  0.022 -0.004  0.015 -0.029  0.031 
Group 0.025  0.021 0.025  0.021 -0.017  0.010 -0.024  0.019 0.007  0.013 0.027  0.026 
YICs 0.174 *** 0.066 0.179 *** 0.067 0.204 *** 0.033 0.259 *** 0.054 0.232 *** 0.043 0.368 *** 0.074 
Subsidy 0.055 ** 0.026 0.057 ** 0.026 0.004  0.013 0.018  0.023 0.020  0.017 0.057 * 0.031 
Subsidized YICs 0.022  0.102 0.018  0.103 -0.198 *** 0.051 -0.246 *** 0.085 -0.068  0.066 -0.162  0.115 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.279 *** 0.062 0.269 *** 0.063 0.069   0.031 -0.032   0.056 0.071 * 0.040 -0.139 * 0.080 
Sigma      0.243  0.006      0.195  0.008      0.258  0.010 
Log-likelihhod      -26.095638      -151.04682      -254.56768 
Number of obs. 754 754 (23 left cens.) 762 762 (379 left cens.) 759 759 (400 left cens.) 
 
As discussed in Section 3.4, the subsidy dummies are unlikely to be exogenous. 
Therefore, in order to check the robustness of our results we repeat the previous 
regressions, instrumenting for the two potentially endogenous variables with the 
earlier discussed methodology and instruments (share of subsidized firms per industry 
and per region).  
 
The first stage results are reported in Appendix 3. As expected, our excluded 
instruments are strongly significant. They also reveal that firms performing basic 
research are more likely to receive subsidies. In addition, large firms and R&D 
intensive firms are more likely to receive subsidies.  Firms that are embedded in a 
larger group are less likely to receive subsidies. Interestingly, although the summary 
statistics reported a high share of YICs receiving subsidies, once correcting for other 
firm, industry and region characteristics, YICs are not significantly more likely to be 
receiving subsidies. This result is consistent with the observation that most programs 
in Germany are not specifically targeted at YICs. 
 
Regarding the statistical validity of instruments, the tests reported at the bottom of the 
first stage regressions in the Appendix indicate that they pass an F-test of excluded 
instruments and a test of overidentification, as indicated by the Sargan-Hansen 
statistic. 
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The second stage IV results for innovative performance are presented in Table 9.  The 
IV coefficients are larger in magnitude, and have larger standard errors, resulting in 
wider confidence intervals, that contain the coefficients found in the previous 
regressions. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the coefficients associated to the 
instrumented variables are statistically different from the non-instrumented ones.  
 
The instrumented subsidy dummy remains significantly positive in explaining share 
of sales with new and improved products (SSnewimp).  It gains further significance 
for products with market novelties (SSnewM), but remains insignificant for products 
new to the firm (SSnewF). The negative subsidized YICs dummy now becomes 
significant at the 10% level for sales with new/improved products (SSnewimp), and 
even at the 5% level for sales with market novelties (SSnewM). This would suggest 
that subsidized YICs do worse than non-subsidized YICs in terms of new/improved 
products and even more so for products with market novelties. Another way of 
reading this result is that while in general receiving subsidies improves the innovative 
performance of innovators, this does not hold for YICs, particularly for improving 
their innovative performance with respect to products new to the market. Receiving 
subsidies even reduces the innovative performance of YICs. All this suggests that the 
system of allocating subsidies in place at the time of the sample did not succeed in 
dealing effectively with the specific nature and problems of YICs, associating them 
with higher innovative performance, particularly their more drastic innovative 
performance. Since the results suggest on the contrary a significantly negative effect, 
a hands-off policy vis-à-vis YICs would have given even better results.17 It remains to 
be seen whether a subsidy policy that would be more targeted towards YICs, taking 
into account their specifics, would have the capacity to generate more positive results. 
 
 
Table 9: Estimation results for YICs, subsidies and innovative performance (2) IV results 
 
Share of sales with new/improved products 
SSnewimp 
Share of sales with products new to the firm 
SSnewF 
Share of sales with market novelties 
SSnewM 
 IV IV Tobit IV IV Tobit IV IV Tobit 
  Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. 
log(age) -0.015  0.011 -0.014  0.011 -0.007  0.005 -0.010  0.009 -0.008  0.008 -0.017  0.013 
log(employment) -0.018 ** 0.008 -0.018 ** 0.008 -0.003  0.004 0.003  0.006 -0.009 * 0.006 0.000  0.010 
                                                 
17 When including on top of the YICs dummy, 3 separate dummies for young age, small size and high 
RDI, almost the same results are obtained for the YICs, Subsized and Subsized YICs in the three 
specifications. 
 26
R&D intensity 0.160 *** 0.055 0.161 *** 0.056 0.076 *** 0.027 0.077 * 0.044 0.162 *** 0.040 0.189 *** 0.064 
Basic R&D reliance -0.034  0.038 -0.033  0.038 -0.003  0.017 -0.015  0.031 -0.024  0.027 -0.066  0.046 
Group 0.011  0.026 0.012  0.027 -0.017  0.012 -0.022  0.022 -0.011  0.019 0.007  0.032 
YICs 0.581 ** 0.249 0.584 ** 0.253 0.193  0.121 0.219  0.200 0.688 *** 0.184 0.892 *** 0.294 
Subsidy 0.278 ** 0.127 0.272 ** 0.130 0.007  0.058 0.025  0.105 0.204 ** 0.097 0.344 ** 0.160 
Subsidized YICs -1.185 * 0.646 -1.179 * 0.657 -0.169  0.327 -0.139  0.538 -1.382 *** 0.476 -1.725 ** 0.767 
Industry dummies 0.088  0.082 0.093  0.083 0.027  0.037 0.018  0.067 0.070  0.059 0.161  0.102 
Constant 0.295 *** 0.069 0.285 *** 0.071 0.070 ** 0.032 -0.030   0.057 0.082   0.051 -0.114   0.090 
Number of observations 754 754 (23 left cens.) 762 762 (379 left cens.) 759 759 (400 left cens.) 
 
4.2.4 Sensitivity of subsidy effects with respect to the YIC definition 
 
We check the sensitivity of our subsidy results using alternative scenarios for defining 
the target population of Young Innovative Companies. Table 10 includes the 
coefficients on YICs, Subsized and Subsized YICs for the IV Tobit specifications for 
the various alternative YIC scenarios. Only the results on the SSnewimp and SSnewM 
innovation performance measures are reported, as the concerned coefficients remain 
insignificant in the SSnewF regressions, also in the alternative scenarios. 
 
 
Table 10: Estimation results for YICs, subsidies and subsidzed YICs in innovative performance 
for alternative YIC scenarios 
 
IV Tobit Results 
Alternative YIC 
scenarios 
SSnewimp 
 
SSnewM 
 Ag
e 
Size RDI YICs  Subsidize
d 
Subsidize
d YICs  
YICs  Subsidize
d 
Subsidize
d YICs  
1 <6 <25
0 
>15
% 
0.584** 0.272** -1.179* 0.892**
* 
0.344** -1.725** 
2 <15 <250 >15% 0.356**
* 
0.228* -0.407 0.597** 0.290* -0.943 
3 All <250 >15% 0.186**
* 
0.196 0.126 0.202**
* 
0.118 -0.423 
4 <6 <250 >8% 0.221 0.330** -0.260 0.380** 0.373** -0.678 
5 <6 <250 All 0.058 0.339** -0.168 0.017 0.346** 0.101 
6 <15 <500 >8% 0.301**
* 
0.331** -0.485** 0.323**
* 
0.375** -0.484** 
 
When softening the criteria for YICs across scenarios, the superior innovative 
performance of YICs looses importance. This holds again especially for the new-to-
the-market innovative performance. In some cases, it even looses significance. The 
differential subsized YICs effect remains negative in most cases, but looses at least 
size and almost always even significance. Hence, expanding the criteria for the target 
population, makes YICs less adversely affected by subsidies, but at the same time also 
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less exceptional in their innovative performance, as table 5 showed. Again, the NTBF 
category leaves no significant results.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Recent policy initiatives, such as the creation of the YICs status at the European level, 
aim at improving the financial environment for European entrepreneurial activity and 
more specifically to support newly-founded innovative firms in order to spur their 
innovation and growth. But are young innovative companies indeed the most 
promising actors for innovation? And can policy intervention make a difference for 
these companies?  
 
Our econometric results, using German CIS data, confirm the presumption that young, 
small, innovation-intensive firms, a very small but distinct segment in the group of 
innovative companies, achieve significantly higher innovative sales than do other 
innovation-active firms. This result is particularly strong for more “radical” type of 
innovations, and comes on top of controls for non-linear age, size and R&D intensity 
effects. We also find that access to finance is the most important factor that hampers 
YICs’ innovation activities, significantly more than other innovating firms. In our 
German sample, most public policies toward innovations are general and have no 
specific focus on YICs and their distinctive characteristics. When evaluating the 
effectiveness of these general R&D innovation subsidy schemes, we find that while 
on average R&D subsidies increase the innovative performances of innovating firms 
in our sample, this result does not hold for YICs. We also find that the results are 
robust to small and unidimensional changes in the criteria for identifying YICs. With 
multidimensional and more substantial changes in the criteria, particularly with 
respect to R&D intensity, the larger target group of companies becomes less 
exceptional in their innovative performance, particularly on radical innovativeness, 
but at the same time also less likely to be adversely affected by subsidies.     
 
A full welfare analysis of a policy targeted at YIC is clearly beyond the scope of this 
paper, requiring a performance analysis extending beyond innovative performance 
and including indirect effects on other market participants.  A few partial policy 
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insights can nevertheless be generated. The extremely small number of relevant target 
companies,  puts in perspective the prospects of motivating policy attention towards 
YICs in their capacity of job creation as a response to high unemployment rates.  
However, as shown in our analysis, their social value and therefore policy interest, 
rests on their potential to introduce substantially new innovations, on which other 
innovators can further build. Therefore, if policy makers want to help overcome the 
barriers that YICs face, in particular the finance barrier, they should take into account 
the specific nature of YICs to be more effectively targeting this group. 
 
Our analysis of the innovative success of YICs opens several opportunities for future 
work. First, this paper has focused on public subsidies as a potential answer to 
financial constraints. Kortum and Lerner (2000) show that Venture Capital (VC) 
accounts for a large share of industrial innovations in the U.S. Therefore, future 
research should focus on whether VC affects YICs’ innovative performances and 
whether there is likely to be synergies between VC funding and public subsidies. 
Second, the commercialization strategies of young innovative firms are a crucial 
determinant of their success. Therefore, in future work, we will attempt to analyze 
these strategies that could take the form of either cooperation with established 
companies (Gans, Hsu and Stern, 2002) or competition on the product market. 
Finally, the innovative success of YICs, in competition or cooperation with 
established companies, might be linked to their appropriation strategies, which is why 
future research should also include the strength of the appropriation regime.   
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Appendix 1: List of variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Share of sales with new products 
(SSnewimp) 
Percentage of total sales derived from 
new or substantially improved products 
introduced between 2002 and 2004 
Share of sales with products new to the 
firm  
(SSnewF) 
Percentage of total sales derived from 
new products with no predecessor within 
the firm, introduced between 2002 and 
2004 
Share of sales with products new to the 
market 
(SSnewM) 
Percentage of total sales derived from 
new products with no predecessor on the 
market, introduced between 2002 and 
2004 
Size Number of employees 
Age Number of years since foundation 
Group =1 if part of a larger group 
R&D intensity Amount of R&D expenditures relative to 
sales 
YIC =1 if age <=6, size<=250 and R&D 
intensity>=15% 
Basic R&D reliance Measure of importance for the innovation 
process of information from research 
institutes and universities relative to the 
importance of suppliers and customers as 
an information source. 
Subsidized =1 if the firm received an R&D subsidy 
from the German Federal Governement, 
from the regional authorities, from the 
European Union or from another source, 
between 2002 and 2004. 
Subsidized YIC = Subsidized x YIC 
Share of subsidized firms per region Number of firms that received a subsidy 
relative to the total number of firms per 
region (Bundesland) 
Share of subsidized firms per industry Number of firms that received a subsidy 
relative to the total number of firms per 
industry (defined at the NACE 2-digit 
level) 
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Appendix 2: Econometric evidence on YICs and financial constraints 
 
 
The descriptive statistics showed that YICs seem to be more hampered by the lack of 
available finances. In order to further investigate this finding, we estimate an order 
probit model relating the scores of (perceived) external and internal financing 
constraints as barriers to innovation (on a scale from zero to three), to the YICs and a 
set of control variables.  
Our estimations, using ordered probit analysis (in a similar way to Canepa and 
Stoneman, 2008), confirm that YICs are more likely to suffer from financial 
constraints. In addition and as expected, the estimations show that big firms are less 
likely to be financially constraint, whereas firms that do more basic R&D are more 
likely to consider internal and external lack of finances as an obstacle to innovation. 
The thresholds parameters correspond to the estimated cut-off points for the 
probability of the four possible outcomes. 
 
 Internal financial  External financial  
 constraints constraints 
  Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. 
log(age) -0.010  0.034 -0.013  0.035
log(employment) -0.111 *** 0.020 -0.156 *** 0.021
R&D intensity 0.254  0.201 0.290  0.206
Basic R&D reliance 0.170 ** 0.078 0.195 ** 0.078
Group 0.043  0.072 0.045  0.072
YICs 0.732 *** 0.208 0.507 ** 0.203
Industry dummies Included Included 
Threshold 1 -0.872  0.241 -1.002  0.245
Threshold 2 0.040  0.240 -0.227  0.244
Threshold 3 0.779   0.241 0.393   0.244
Log-likelihood -1631.281 -1599.742 
Number of observations 1235 1231 
 
For all other barriers, the YICs variable is not significantly different from zero. These 
estimates are not reported for brevity. 
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Appendix 3: First stage regressions 
 
The table reports the first stage results for subsidies on three samples, since the 
number of available observations is somewhat different for the three dependent 
variables. 
 
 
 Share of sales with products 
Share of sales with products new to 
the firm Share of sales with market novelties 
 Subsidy Subsidized YICs Subsidy Subsidized YICs Subsidy Subsidized YICs 
  
Coef
.   S.D. 
Coef
.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. 
Coef
.   S.D. 
Coef
.   S.D. 
log(age) 
-
0.00
7  
0.01
4 
-
0.00
1  
0.00
4 
-
0.007  
0.01
4
-
0.00
1  
0.00
4 
-
0.00
6  
0.01
4 
-
0.00
1  
0.00
4 
log(employment) 
0.03
7 
**
* 
0.00
8 
0.00
2  
0.00
2 0.035 
**
* 
0.00
8
0.00
2  
0.00
2 
0.03
7 
**
* 
0.00
8 
0.00
2  
0.00
2 
R&D intensity 
0.08
7 * 
0.04
7 
0.07
1 
**
* 
0.01
2 0.083 * 
0.04
6
0.06
6 
**
* 
0.01
2 
0.08
8 * 
0.04
7 
0.07
1 
**
* 
0.01
2 
Basic R&D reliance 
0.18
4 
**
* 
0.03
4 
0.01
3  
0.00
9 0.185 
**
* 
0.03
2
0.01
3  
0.00
9 
0.17
7 
**
* 
0.03
3 
0.01
2  
0.00
8 
Group 
-
0.05
6 ** 
0.02
9 
-
0.01
8 ** 
0.00
8 
-
0.049 * 
0.02
9
-
0.01
6 ** 
0.00
8 
-
0.04
9 * 
0.02
9 
-
0.01
7 ** 
0.00
8 
YICs 
0.01
6  
0.65
2 
-
0.37
3 ** 
0.16
9 0.052  
0.64
7
-
0.32
3 * 
0.17
1 
-
0.00
5  
0.65
2 
-
0.37
3 ** 
0.16
9 
Share of subsidized firms p. region 
2.03
5 
**
* 
0.43
6 
-
0.00
3  
0.11
3 2.219 
**
* 
0.44
9
0.00
8  
0.11
9 
2.09
2 
**
* 
0.44
4 
-
0.00
7  
0.11
5 
Share of subsidized firms p. 
industry 
0.96
0 
**
* 
0.24
9 
-
0.07
4  
0.06
5 0.893 
**
* 
0.24
6
-
0.08
1  
0.06
5 
0.86
0 
**
* 
0.25
0 
-
0.07
0  
0.06
5 
Share of subsidized firms p. 
region*YICs 
4.79
1  
8.08
9 
9.43
0 
**
* 
2.09
9 3.821  
7.98
4
8.28
7 
**
* 
2.10
9 
4.99
5  
8.08
3 
9.44
3 
**
* 
2.09
3 
Share of subsidized firms p. 
industry*YICs 
-
1.35
9 ** 
0.66
7 
0.10
8  
0.17
3 
-
1.209 * 
0.65
0
0.26
9  
0.17
2 
-
1.30
2 ** 
0.66
7 
0.10
8  
0.17
3 
Industry dummies 
-
0.00
2  
0.10
6 
0.00
4  
0.02
7 
-
0.009  
0.10
2
0.00
3  
0.02
7 
-
0.01
2  
0.10
4 
0.00
3  
0.02
7 
Constant 
-
0.33
3 
**
* 
0.09
7 
-
0.00
2   
0.02
5 
-
0.347 
**
* 
0.09
6
-
0.00
3   
0.02
5 
-
0.34
0 
**
* 
0.09
7 
-
0.00
2   
0.02
5 
Number of observations available 754 762 759 
Diagnostic test and statistics                        
(based on liner regression 
model)                       
F test of excluded instruments 9.25*** 5.34*** 9.51*** 4.30*** 8.70*** 5.35*** 
Sargan-Hansen Statistic 4.307 4.554 4.976 
 
 
